Ranking the GMs, #26: J.P. Ricciardi

by Brent Morris

J.P. Ricciardi has been the general manager of the Toronto Blue Jays for almost 7 years, and whenever his name is mentioned, Billy Beane is still almost inevitably brought up. This is a clear demonstration of the man's utter mediocrity at managing a baseball team - he has been able to keep a job for seven years, a rarity in a business where one wretched season will have you updating your resume to send off to the Cincinnati Reds, but has not been able to emerge from the giant shadow his former boss continues to cast.

Overall, Riccardi's Blue Jays are 481-491 from 2002-2007, and this season they have compiled another tremendously average record of 47-49 so far. The astute observer wonders - "How can Ricciardi possibly rank this low? He's had average results and has managed to keep his job for 7 years." The reasoning is simple - Ricciardi has had time to overhaul a moribund organization and has done nothing to do so - the cupboard is bare, the team is right in that meaty part of the Bell Curve, not showing off, but not falling behind. Baseball Prospectus ranked their prospects 24th overall - this is a team that is officially Going Nowhere. With the Rays' upward surge this season, this is going to be a team seeing a lot of 4th place finishes in its future.

Bright-eyed Ricciardi arrived in Toronto with much fanfare - baseball had lost its lustre in the New York of Canada, after Skydome set attendance records in the early 90s with the World Champions, the team had fallen into a funk. The 2001 Toronto Blue Jays were only 80-82, but more importantly, their attendance was short of 2 million - half of the team's record setting marks of the Paul Molitor and Joe Carter days. Gord Ash was let go, and JP Riccardi was brought in, the team ownership hoping he could work that Billy Beane magic on a mid-level budget instead of a small-market one. Ricciardi began by moving closer Billy Koch to the A's for Eric Hinske and Justin Miller. Hinske would hit .279/.365/.481 en route to a Rookie of the Year campaign in 2002. J.P. would fire manager Buck Martinez in mid-season and replace him with Carlos Tosca, one of the few managers in baseball history with no professional baseball experience. Aside from that, his first year was relatively quiet - he dumped malcontent and high-salaried Raul Mondesi on the Yankees, and released future Cy Young award winner Chris Carpenter. In 2003, Roy Halladay and Vernon Wells would emerge as legitimate stars - the team finished 86-76, 15 games in back of the Yankees, but still on the rise. The team nabbed Aqualino Lopez in the Rule 5 draft, and he ended up leading the team in saves with 14. No major deals would come out of the 2003 off-season - the club let go of Kelvim Escobar and Cory Lidle, acquired Miguel Batista to write crime novels, and managed to nab a decent arm in Justin Speier for former NBA bench player Mark Hendrickson.

2004 was a miserable season as the Toronto Blue Jays finished below the Tampa Bay Devil Rays in 5th place of the AL East. The team ranked 12th in OBP and SLG, posting a weak .328 and .403 in those categories respectively. Eric Hinske hit a deplorable .246/.312/.375. Journeyman Chris Gomez got into 110 games at shortstop - always an ill omen. The team had more players finish with a sub-zero VORP than positive - and 31 starts of Pat Hengten and Justin Miller's over 6 ERA didn't help matters. Carlos Tosca was fired and replaced with John Gibbons in mid-season. However, Ricciardi would spend the off-season essentially doing nothing - releasing fringe players, adding more fringe players. He signed Billy Koch, who would never pitch again in the major leagues. He would sign Cory Koskie, a solid third baseman who posted a .495 SLG. However, he let the face of the franchise for the post World Series Blue Jays, Carlos Delgado, walk to the Marlins, replacing him with the seemingly indomitable Eric Hinske. The 2005 Blue Jays were back to .500 - 80-82 - and the team's OBP was 4th in the league, buoyed by professional hitters like Frank Catalanotto, Shea Hillenbrand and Gregg Zaun. In spite of a Roy Halladay injury, Gustavo Chacin and Josh Towers arrived to post sub-4 ERAs with totally unsustainable peripherals - Chacin posted a 3.72 ERA by walking 70 and striking out 121 in 203 innings, Towers would only strike out 112 in 208 innings.

The Blue Jays were always on the cusp - that season where Wells and Halladay would repeat their earlier successes, and prospects like Russ Adams and Alex Rios would finally get on track. 2006 was to be the breakout year - the Jays signed B.J. Ryan and A.J. Burnett to huge contracts - Burnett to a 5 year/55 million dollar deal, Ryan to a 5 year, 47 million dollar deal, the biggest ever granted to a closer in baseball history. After J.P. signed B.J. and A.J., the team traded for Brewers' 1st baseman Lyle Overbay and dealt former closer Batista and slick-fielding second baseman Orlando Hudson to the Diamondbacks for slugging 3rd baseman Troy Glaus - and Corey Koskie, after one season, was sent packing. Glaus had just hit 37 home runs for the Diamondbacks, Ryan had just posted a 2.43 ERA and 36 saves in his first season as Orioles' closer, and Burnett had almost struck out a man per inning while posting a 3.44 ERA for the Marlins. Bengie Molina was signed to a one-year deal to catch, despite Zaun's superb OBP from the previous season. It was Ricciardi's year to challenge the Yankees - themselves coming off a year where they salvaged a playoff berth only thanks to the incredible luck of Aaron Small and Shawn Chacon - and the Red Sox, themselves overhauling a roster that had won them the World Series two years earlier. Russ Adams and Aaron Hill, Ricciardi draft picks, were to supplant currently established players.

It worked - almost. Toronto finished 2nd in the division, ahead of the Red Sox, but were still 10 games behind the Yankees. Alex Rios finally emerged as a star - but the team's other younger players had left something to be desired. Aaron Hill hit .291/.349/.386 as a capable fill-in for Hudson, but Russ Adams had a dismal sub-600 OPS and had to be replaced by veteran gloveman John McDonald. On the veterans' front, Molina slugged 19 home runs, but only walked 19 times. Shea Hillenbrand, now to be the team's DH, was traded at mid-season after a fight with manager John Gibbons. The Jays' pitching staff used 12 different starters - wunderkind Gustavo Chacin got injured and was ineffective when he did pitch, Josh Towers gave up more than a home run per start, Burnett was solid when he stayed healthy, and the team got too much 5th starter pitching in general. In the bullpen, B.J. Ryan was spectacular as closer, and Justin Speier capable as a setup man, but Scott Schoeneweis was atrocious. In all, it appears that Ricciardi overestimated Chacin and Towers' ability to repeat their breakout 2005 seasons - both gave him sub-replacement level pitching in 2006, when they were healthy. In all, the addition of Ryan and Burnett only nudged the Jays' team ERA up from 6th in the AL in '05 to 5th in '06.

In the 2006 off-season, Ricciardi would augment the team with some veteran hitters, signing future Hall of Famer Frank Thomas to be the team's designated hitter, and signing the famous Canadian Matt Stairs to play left field, I guess. Once again the team would finish above .500 - Thomas hit a capable .277/.377/.480, and Stairs slugged .549 in a part-time role - but the team had a batting hole at shortstop with McDonald posting a Ray Oyler like .279 OBP. Rookie Adam Lind struggled as well in left, and Reed Johnson forgot how to hit - having posted a .390 OBP the previous season, he had a .305 OBP in 2007. No one on the 2007 Jays hit 30 home runs, no one hit .300, and only Stairs posted a better than .500 SLG. As for pitching - BJ Ryan missed almost the entire 2007 campaign, and so the team was forced to install Jeremy Accardo as their closer. Regardless, the team pitched rather well, finishing 2nd in the AL in overall ERA - but 12th in BA and OBP.

2008 has been Ricciardi's most puzzling campaign to date. He traded Troy Glaus for Tony Larussa-hating Scott Rolen. He signed Gritty McGrit to supplant McDonald at shortstop - David Eckstein. These moves were not altogether strange - but when the season began, J.P. went into weirdo mode. He released Frank Thomas after Thomas accused the team of benching him to ensure he didn't reach bonus plateaus - Thomas was only hitting .167/.306/.333, but has posted a 900+ OPS for the As since returning to the Bay Area. He fired John Gibbons and replaced him with Cito Gaston of Toronto World Series fame. He also publicly questioned Adam Dunn's desire to play baseball on Toronto sports radio, then sought him out for an apology.

In writing this, I learned that perhaps J.P. Ricciardi is unfairly maligned - he has had the misfortune of never having his good pitching and good hitting seasons line up. There is some bad luck in that - but the team has also never pursued the right kinds of free agents, always paying too much for spots that weren't enormous holes, while stocking the rest of the roster with league average types. In 2008, the Blue Jays' leader in VORP is Vernon Wells, whom the team has locked up long-term, with a stellar 11.4 VORP. That's good for 136th in the league. The horizon doesn't look that promising - Ricciardi's tenure did produce decent pitching prospects in Marcum and Jesse Litsch, but he has only produced Aaron Hill out of his own drafting - and Hill is a mediocre 2nd baseman with little upside. At least with a moron like Ed Wade there's the promise of a fluky playoff season when he cobbles together some veterans - Ricciardi has been unwilling to trade away his prospects or gamble on a big free agent hitter. Toronto fans must ask, Where are the Ed Spragues of yesteryear? At least fans of more outwardly inept teams have the hope that that man will be fired and will be replaced by a pencil-pushing nerd with degrees in Econostatofinanceometrics - but there seems to be no shelter for long-suffering Blue Jays fans, and the turf at the Rogers Centre will never be as green as it was in the early 1990s.

Pitcher Savvy

Using Pitch F/X Data to Anticipate Peripherals
by Paul Calluzzo

A few months ago Sal Baxmusa talked about building blocks of sabermetrics at The Hardball Times. A main point he made was that peripheral pitching statistics are the building blocks for ERA, which is in turn is the building block of wins. Along these lines of reasoning he made the observation that the development of pitch F/X data would provide the building block for the pitching peripherals statistics BB%, K% and GB/FB rate. Thanks to the information readily available on the Internet, specifically through Fangraphs' Export function and Josh Kalk’s “Bornbybits” Blog, I was able to acquire pitch data that allowed me to quantify pitchers’ "stuff." This data included the fastball velocity, vertical fastball movement, horizontal fastball movement, # of pitches in repertoire, and % of pitches which were fastballs. Using regression analysis I was then able to quantify how these skills affected a pitchers peripherals (BB%, K% GB/FB and FIP). Through this analysis I was then able to assign an expected outcome for each pitcher given their “stuff.”

By looking at the difference between expected outcomes and real life outcomes, we can begin to estimate a “pitcher savvy” skill which may explain the difference between the two outcomes (along with random variance and a lack of explanatory power of the model which is due to the obvious flaws in my econometric ability, my assumptions and my data). Below are my findings.

GB/FB Ratio
After toying with the available pitch f/x data I determined that the inputs which affected a pitcher’s GB/FB ratio were fastball velocity and vertical fastball movement. The analysis showed that 10 mph of fastball velocity increases the GB/FB ratio by 0.26. For each inch a pitcher’s fastball drops, the GB/FB ratio increases by .17. The GB/FB ratio prediction formula can be expressed as follows:

GB/FB Ratio = 1.4778 + (Fastball Velocity*0.2622) + (LnVertical Movement*-1.1658)

The formula is significant at a level p<0.01 and with an adjusted R-squared of 51.7. The R-squared essentially says that 51.7% of the variance in GB/FB ratios can be explained by this model. By plugging all 97 pitchers in my sample into this formula, we can see based on “stuff” which pitchers have the highest and lowest Expected (ex) GB/FB rate. This is listed below:

League Leaders in Expected GB/FB			League Losers in Expected GB/FB
Name	Real GB/FB	exGB/FB	Name	Real GB/FB	exGB/FB
Brandon Webb	3.38	3.38	Scott Olsen	0.75	0.84
Roy Halladay	2.25	2.38	Jered Weaver	0.78	0.86
Derek Lowe	2.44	2.12	Barry Zito	1.08	0.88
Greg Maddux	1.77	2.01	Ted Lilly	0.73	0.89
Tim Hudson	2.67	1.88	Shaun Marcum	1.17	0.99

By subtracting Real GB/FB from exGB/FB we can begin to try to isolate the “pitcher savvy” skill. As I stated before we would need an econometrician with skills far exceeding mine before we can feel confident in the “GB/FB ratio pitcher savvy” metric. This doesn’t mean it’s not fun:

League Leaders in GB Savvy		League Losers in GB Savvy
Name	GB Savvy	Name	GB Savvy
Tim Hudson	0.79	Micah Owings	-0.77
Andy Pettitte	0.76	David Bush	-0.56
Jair Jurrjens	0.59	Paul Byrd	-0.56
John Lannan	0.58	Randy Wolf	-0.51
Jon Garland	0.52	Brandon Backe	-0.48

K/9
I determined that the inputs which affected a pitcher’s K/9 were fastball velocity, horizontal fastball movement and % of pitchers thrown which are fastballs (Fastball %). The analysis showed that 10 mph of fastball velocity increases the K/9 by 3.6. For 10 inches of horizontal movement K/9 increase by 0.6. For a 10% decreases in Fastball %, K/9 increases by 0.3. The K/9 predication formula can be expressed as follows:

K/9 = -23.6625 + (Fastball Velocity*0.3559) + (Horizontal Movement*0.0599) + (Fastball %*-0.0313)

The formula is significant at a level p<0.03 and with an adjusted R-squared of 28.6, meaning 28.6% of the variance in K/9 can be explained by this model. An obvious flaw of this analysis is that to determine “stuff” I am only looking at fastball data. It is outside of my abilities to incorporate multiple pitches into the analysis. I figured a proxy of non-fastball stuff would be Fastball % and the number of pitches in a pitcher’s repertoire (defined as pitches pitcher throws more than 10% of the time). Running these two input variables through the output data, it was shown that Fastball % but not Pitch Repertoire had a significant relationship on the output data. This was the logic for including it in the formula.

As with GB/FB ratio, I will now give a list of league leaders and losers in expected K/9 and Strikeout Savvy:

League Leaders in Expected K/9			League Losers in Expected K/9
Name	Real K/9	exK/9	Name	Real K/9	exK/9
CC Sabathia	8.98	8.25	Greg Maddux	4.43	3.45
Dustin McGowan	6.87	7.84	Livan Hernandez	3.36	3.51
Randy Johnson	8.72	7.61	Jamie Moyer	5.53	4.32
Tim Lincecum	9.38	7.60	Paul Byrd	3.88	4.76
Felix Hernandez	8.04	7.60	Mike Mussina	5.70	4.76

League Leaders in K/9 Savvy		League Losers in K/9 Savvy
Name	K/9 Savvy	Name	K/9 Savvy
Chad Billingsley	3.10	Zach Duke	-2.73
Jonathan Sanchez	2.65	Jesse Litsch	-2.66
Brandon Webb	2.64	Joe Saunders	-2.41
Ted Lilly	2.31	Jon Garland	-2.28
Edinson Volquez	2.21	Nick Blackburn	-2.19

BB%
Analysis showed that both horizontal fastball movement and Fastball % had a statically significant (p<.03) effect on BB%. However, for two reasons I will not delve further into the analysis. Firstly, the adjusted R squared showed that the model only explained 10.3% of the variance in BB%. Secondly and more importantly, I believe that this minimal amount of variance is due to a self-selecting sample error. A pitcher who is able to mix in non-fastball pitches and throws high-movement fastballs can get away with more walks because he is striking out more batters. A pitcher who is unable to mix up his pitches and throws low-movement fastballs, and also walks a lot of batters, is probably not in the Major Leagues. A self-selecting sample may undermine much of the other above data, but logic dictates (I do not know of a way to test for the error) that it is particularly vicious in this part of the analysis.

I also wanted to look at how my “Savvy” stats were related to age, but the same self-selecting sample error would arise. Instead it would be necessary to look at the change in the Savvy metric as an individual pitcher ages. I think that would be a lot of fun.

FIP
My method of analysis to investigate the relationship between “stuff” and FIP was draining. For a time I thought the best method would be to use the discussed “expected” peripherals and use these as building blocks to construct FIP via the traditional FIP formula. Unfortunately I could not find a formula which used these variables in this exact form. Furthermore I did not have a big enough sample of pitchers to make my own FIP metric. I tried but could only get a model with an adjusted-R square of 0.25 which I thought was too low to move forward in this way. In the end I found it most effective to work straight from the pitch F/X data. Perhaps this was another area in which my econometric skills failed me. With this behind us, I think the derived “Complete Savvy” metric is the most telling, if not in an adjusted R-squared perspective, then in a qualitative who-is-doing-the-most-with-the-least and the-least-with-the-most sort of perspective.

I determined that the inputs that affected a pitcher’s FIP were fastball velocity and vertical fastball movement. The analysis showed that 10 mph of fastball velocity decreased FIP by 1.06. 10 inches of fastball drop decreased FIP by 0.46. The FIP prediction formula can be expressed as follows:

FIP = 11.8224 + (Fastball Velocity*-0.0964) + (LnVertical Movement*0.44397)

The formula is significant at a level p<0.06 and with an adjusted R-squared of 14.5, meaning 14.5% of the variance in FIP can be explained by this model. Below are the league leaders and losers in Expected FIP and Complete Savvy:

League Leaders in Expected FIP			League Losers in Expected FIP
Name	Real FIP	exFIP	Name	Real FIP	exFIP
Roy Halladay	2.88	3.46	Jamie Moyer	4.35	4.85
Brandon Webb	3.03	3.50	Barry Zito	4.84	4.75
Felix Hernandez	3.28	3.62	Livan Hernandez	4.48	4.69
Ublado Jimenez	3.88	3.63	Kenny Rogers	4.85	4.58
Josh Beckett	3.45	3.68	Mike Mussina	3.81	4.57

League Leaders in Complete Savvy		League Losers in Complete Savvy
Name	Savvy	Name	Savvy
Cliff Lee	1.85	Brett Myers	-1.54
Dan Haren	1.23	Vicente Padilla	-1.44
Justin Duchscherer	1.19	Brandon Backe	-1.36
Tim Lincecum	1.07	Oliver Perez	-1.34
John Danks	1.04	Daniel Cabrera	-1.26

Applications
Assuming that “Savvy” is a measure of the gap between talent and performance, it may be useful as a tool to identify underperforming players. Not so much in the vein of FIP vs ERA where a large sample size would fix the discrepancy. I think it would be more along the lines of needing an expert (i.e. sabermetrics-minded pitching coach Rick Peterson) adjusting a pitcher’s approach to the game in order to improve their Savvy and bring their performance in line with their talent. Perhaps the next step (in addition to shoring up the robustness of the model with a larger sample size) of this model would be identifying “talent” inputs such as the discussed fastball velocity and movement, but also incorporating “approach” inputs which may also be components of savvy. I wonder if it is true that only by quantitatively identifying the inputs of “savvy” can it be taught.

Perhaps Savvy could be used in ways similar to BABIP for batters. Outliers in Pitcher Savvy (both compared to previous years for themselves and compared to all pitchers) may be due for a regression to the mean. On the subject of individual pitchers’ Savvy over the years, I would be curious to see if this is a repeatable skill, or simply random variance. I’m hoping it is a repeatable skill, otherwise I think that means that Savvy falls into the same bin “clutch” stats are in.

Shortcomings
All this data needs to be taken with a large grain of salt for two reasons. The first problem is the small sample size the model deals with. I am not sure how many years back the Pitch F/X data goes; I only took 97 starting pitchers from 2008 as chosen by Fangraphs. There are no reasons (other than me not wanting to spend days compiling the data) that this sample should not be in the several hundreds if not the thousands. This would instantly make the data more robust.

The second major shortcoming is a dearth of input variables. There are many more metrics which are available but were not included due to inconvenience and my own inabilities. Off the top of my head I think there would be value in looking at metrics such as “release point variability” and “release point distance from home plate.” I have already discussed how this model does not take into account secondary stuff (think Mr. Hamels’ changeup). Furthermore, there is no input metric to gauge control (Strike % or Ball % may suffice) in the model. Some may argue that control is not a component of “stuff” and thus should be excluded from a model that looks at the relationship between “stuff,” “savvy” and peripherals. Where exactly does control fall? Is it a physical skill or more an issue of a pitcher’s approach to the game? I am not exactly sure, but there would be no harm in plugging control variables into the model and seeing what the computer gods spit out.

Because of these problems with the model it is difficult to say how much of the variance between the expected and real life outcomes are due to “Savvy,” how much is due to missing inputs which would yield a statistical significance, and how much is due to natural random variance. Because of this it is would be presumptuous to call the various “Savvy” metrics and regression models I have presented as anything more than pilots. They show the possibilities of analysis the Pitch F/X makes available, but fall far short of the finish line. Well, I also think they are kind of fun to play with. I have only presented the top and bottom five pitchers in each category in this article. It is fun to look up players, and see how your expectations match the results of the model. An example of this is Jamie Moyer’s last-in-league expected FIP matching his beer league “stuff.”

I have one semester of Econometrics under my belt as my statistical training. I’m sure I overlooked a lot. If nothing else, I hope that someone more skilled and with more time then myself will grab upon this article and improve its content. (Well, that’s if I do not have a message in my inbox from Mr. Wilpon.) Not to knock The Hardball Times but I do not find their Anatomy of Pitcher series to be very interesting. Instead I think this is the future of the pitch F/X data: to roll the building blocks back a level from FIP, and look at what factors determine pitching peripherals.

Nine in a Row, ZomG!

LGM.

The proprietor of Tacoby Bellsbury is a hanger-on. I once commended Surly Blondbeard for his funny blog that is also named by changing the beginnings of the first and last names of a young baseball player, and now he's obsessed with me.

Plus, his blog is seriously ugly. I know people hate the black background here but at least it's not puke-green.

The Mets are the graveyard team: Tatis, Easley, Julio Franco, Tom Glavine, I could go on. They just stack it up with has beens and never will bes, I can't wait until Kenny Lofton signs on with them for the playoffs. Oh yeah. You don't think Minaya will shell the $3 mil or whatever he wants to be the speed man off the bench? I like Endy Chavez. I like Ryan Go to Church. I hate Carlos Delgado. That's about all I can say about the Mets right now. They will sign Kenny Lofton, Wilfredo Cordero and maybe even Dante Bichette before October. Sorry, September.

Dante Bichette never played for the Expos.

Reports that the Mets are interested in trading for Raúl Ibañez scare the shit out of me. I won't do anyone who dares suggest that the dignity of a link. Except U.S.S. Mariner (Trades I'm Rooting For):

Raul Ibanez to the Mets for LHP Jon Niese and 1B Mike Carp

The Mets are surging, but their outfield is a mess. Moises Alou is out for the year, and Ryan Church’s status is up in the air thanks to lingering concussion issues. Omar Minaya is going to make a move, so the M’s should put themselves in the forefront of his thoughts and convince him that Ibanez is the guy he wants. He has no problem emptying his farm system in attempts to win now, and Ibanez has the reputation to command more than he’s worth.

Niese is a 21-year-old southpaw with an average fastball and good curve who mixes his pitches well and is already succeeding in Double-A. He’s not a high upside guy, but as a potential #3/#4 starter, he’d help give the M’s a legitimate young pitching prospect who could potentially help the team as early as next year.

Carp is a 22-year-old left handed hitting first baseman with a good eye at the plate and gap power. Right now, he projects as a Lyle Overbay type, but there is room in his swing for some extra pop, so it’s not out of the realm of possibility that he grows into a 25 to 30 home run guy down the line.

Why The M’s Should Do This: Ibanez is obviously in decline, and 2008 might be the last year he’s a starting quality player. As such, he shouldn’t spend the rest of the year in Seattle. Niese and Carp give the M’s some moderate reward youngsters that could be useful players down the line.

Why The Mets Should Do This: They sold the farm to get Johan and they’re running down the Phillies in the east, but a Fernando Tatis/Endy Chavez combination isn’t going to work in RF/LF. While they would prefer to keep Niese and Carp, Ibanez will almost certainly be a Type A free agent, so if they offer him arbitration and let him leave in the winter, they’ll get two draft picks to replace the prospects they gave up. The addition of Ibanez for the stretch run and the draft picks makes it worth doing for New York.

Go to hell, Dave. I can't believe this is a real possibility and apparently no one is interested in Adam Dunn because he strikes out too much. Guess what Raul Ibanez can do? If you guessed "play outfield," you would be wrong. He is quite possibly the worst defensive outfielder in the game today. If Barry Bonds came back, he would be better. Hell, Marlon Anderson and Fernando Tatis are better outfielders. Manny Ramirez is better when jogging at half-speed. Mariners blog Lookout Landing lists him as "LF" when they post the lineups in game threads. (They also list Jose Vidro as "DH".) They have a sidebar called "Raul Ibanez is Really Good at Defense." It contains this. And this. And this. And this. AND THIS.

The Mets have a fly ball pitching staff. So, no thanks. Give me Dunn.

Go Matros

I had a couple friends in the WSOP Main Event, but one busted on Day One and the other fell on Day Three. The latter doubled through Phil Hellmuth on Day 2 in a hand that's sure to be on TV, but on Day 3 ran into a bad string of luck and busted short of the money.

Now I'm rooting for poker pro and Brooklynite Matt Matros, who has commented at this blog and sometimes writes for Hot Foot. As of the latest update, Matt's chip stack is second in a field of over 600 (from am initial field of 6844).

Matros already cashed in this World Series, taking sixth place in Event #51: $1500 No-Limit Hold 'Em, good for $148,875. First place in the Main Event is good for $9.1 million.

Update: Matros is eliminated on Day 6 in 78th place. He reraised all-in with A7 and a short stack and got called by 33, saying "That's a great call." (He meant, "That's a terrible call.") The board wasn't favorable and Matros exits the tournament, pocketing $77,200. Nice run, Matt.

Tatis Time? How About No?

Daily News:

Timing, it's all about timing. When Omar Minaya delivered the bad news about Alou, and somebody immediately pushed the Bonds button, the GM's answer contained only one name. The same name the crowd chanted after the important home run and before his last at-bat.

"Right now, we're going to go with our guy," the GM said. "We were talking upstairs and we said, 'It's a good day for Fernando Tatis to have a good day.'"

Omar Minaya's greatest strength as a general manager, ladies and gentlemen: public relations. His greatest weakness: player analysis.

Tatis is an ancient curiosity, an infielder who was never good at playing infield but now "plays" outfield. His only skill is power, which is easily exploited because his swing is long, loopy, and slow. He briefly experienced success in the late nineties when the general quality of pitching in the league was very low, but he has no place on a major league roster except as comical token veteran reserve. Unfortunately, the Mets have a rotating fleet of six or seven of those guys.

Do I like that he has had some dramatic hits for the Mets? Of course. But let's not get carried away. Fernando Tatis is not a hero. He is a guy who is being favored over better options by an irresponsible general manager. We should not chuckle along with Minaya and pretend that we "know" what he's "sayin'." He is failing the fans and his employers with this kind of conduct.

It ain't easy being the voice of reason.

Nick InEvansitability

The young Evans, not ready for major league action, who plays the same positions as Val Pascucci and just as well and looked terribly overmatched in his first appearance with the Mets, gets another look with Ryan Church heading to the DL. He did hit three doubles in a game once.

Productive Outs and Crackerjack:

Nick Evans is back again, presumably to fail as miserably as he did in his first stint with the Mets. No knock on Evans, who may have a future with this club, but he simply is not a major leaguer yet. Better him then Marlon Anderson, I suppose. I think I'm going to end every Roster Move in the future with these words: Free Valentino Pascucci!!

Matt Himelfarb:

Manuel and Mets management did not exactly try and redeem themselves- as if there was that much public outrage over Manuel’s comments anyways- by calling up Nick Evans to replace Ryan Church on the Mets roster. The funny part about this move is that I cannot ascribe it to any bias or hidden agenda or any of that sort of nonsense. Do not get me wrong, I think Evans is a good player with a bright future in front of him, and one short trip to the big leagues may be enough of a motivator this time around. The problem is, in his last trip to the big leagues, Evans looked laughably over matched.

Ok, we get it, Valentino Pascucci hit .177 in 62 at-bats for the Montreal Expos in 2004! But why not give the call to Mike Carp, who is hitting just as well at AA as Evans and has a combined 677 AB’s at the level, compared to Evans 296? It certainly not a left-righty issue, as others have assumed. And while Evans is surely more athletic than Carp, both are playing their first year in the outfield in AA, and the Mets are not exactly throwing out gold glovers in Fernando Tatis and Marlon Anderson lately.

I'll let these fine bloggers speak for me, as I have said all that I can about the Mets' distaste for Pascucci at this point. The good news is, the Mets are winning and Jerry Manuel likes Ramon Castro.

Now that's a lineup

The lineup for today's game in Philadelphia:

Reyes SS
Church RF
Wright 3B
Beltran CF
Easley 2B
Delgado 1B
Castro C
Aguila LF
Maine P

Church hitting second? Awesome! No weak, slap-happy Luis Castillo (Rest on the DL in Peace, Oh Anointed One), Endy Chavez (The Catch! The Bunt Walk-Off!) or Marlon "Pinch-Hitting 'Skill' with Extremely Limited Offensive and Defensive Talents" Anderson!

I would switch Wright and Beltran-- actually I might even move Delgado or Easley into the third spot. Lineup Analysis has shown that the #3 spot is a lot less important than people think, while the #2 spot is a lot more important. Nevertheless, I like it. Another start for Ramon Castro, who, quite simply, is a better all-around player than the presumed regular, Brian Schneider.

And Chris Aguila, well, whatever, he's a right-hander and he's facing a left-hander. Personally I would prefer (you know who) Valentino Pascucci in there at first base instead of Delgado. But the manager doesn't know who he is, and the GM has erroneously decided that he has no value to this team.

Forget last night. Baseball will not stop for us to grieve.

And good luck! to my friend Brent, a frequent commenter here, who is currently playing in Day 1C of the World Series of Poker Main Event.